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Scholarship and Ideology*
By BHIKHU PAREKH

One of the most distinctive characteristics of the modern university
is the tremendous emphasis placed on research, on "expanding the
frontiers of knowledge." The faculty has argued, and the university
authorities have in many cases accepted, that research is the only
worth-while academic activity and that the university largely exists
simply to promote it. In its name the faculty has sometimes even
ignored, with official connivance, many of its academic obligations.
Although, from the standpoint of the university, teaching is more important, research has become a new industry, a new god whose
directives, it is believed, only the illiterate could violate.
Conceptually and historically, research refers to the activity of discovering facts not hitherto known, or once known but subsequently
forgotten. In its extended sense, it refers to a purposive investigation
into the views of other writers on a given topic. Central to the concept
of research is the idea of collecting information by investigation, by
"looking up" a book or a document or "looking out" for certain
phenomena in the laboratory. It is therefore an activity that is crucial
to history, understood as an activity of reconstructing a past event
or an epoch as fully and in as detailed a manner as possible. Indeed, it
is difficult to imagine any significant activity of a historian that does
not involve research. To a slightly lesser degree, it is crucial to science.
Whether he is a botanist or a zoologist or a physicist, a scientist is looking for new natural and experimental facts, and is thus engaged in
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research. But unlike a historian, facts are interesting to him not in
themselves but only as instances, as falling into a general predictable
pattern, for his primary concern is to construct a general theory. Now
theorizing is not just, or even primarily, a matter of gathering facts,
but largely one of sustained and critical reflection on them in order to
elucidate and establish regular and orderly rela tions between them. Of
course, hard, concentrated and imaginative thinking does not take
place in a vacuum and one is therefore required to collect facts. That
is to say, in the scientist's pursuit of knowledge, resea rch (a more or
less empirical activi ty ) by itself is never enough, and needs to be supplemented by reflection ( a non-empirical, a nd what earlier philosophers used to call a rational, activity). Speaking generally, the more
theoretical a form of inquiry, the greater the role of reflection and
lesser the role of research. And when a form of inquiry is purely theoretical-for example, some forms of mathematics and metaphysicsresearch plays very little role in it.
There a re other a reas where knowledge is expanded without much
research. A novelist or a poet exploring new forms of expression is
deepening our insight into human life or into the new possibilities of
the literary medium, and yet no research need be involved. Or again,
a philosopher who a nalyses concepts and draws distinctions between
them often needs to do no more than sit in the armchair and think.
His "source material" lies handy in ordinary language and experience,
and often he does not have to look up or look out but only to look into
his own experiences.
The point I am making is that knowledge is expanded and deepened a nd enriched in a variety of ways, of which research is not the
only one or always even the most important. R esearch occurs in some
but not in all inquiries, and for many of those in which it does occur,
its significa nce often lies in its ability to generate or destroy a theory.
Further, research does not go on only in the laboratory or in research
surveys or in the archives or in the library. It goes on in interpersonal
conversa tions as well. For example, a political philosopher, when discussing political events with a fri end, may be observing how the la tter
interprets and describes them and how he uses certain words. Thus
research is a complex activity tha t cannot be reduced to a single model.
When these limitations of resea rch are ignored, and when it is seen
as the only worth-while activity, or is defined in terms of a single
model, or is divorced from its theoretical moorings and aspirations,
certain unfortunate trends begin to arise. A writer might come to feel
tha t he is not doing anything intellectualy worth-while unless he is
collecting new empirical facts. This danger is pa rticularly great in disciplines like politics, sociology and anthropology, that have their feet
in both the empirical and philosophical camp. A writer here might
come to feel tha t he should give up an "abstract," "intuitive," "sub-
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jective" and "speculative" approach to his discipline, and concentrate
instead on studying it empirically-for example, by drafting a questionnaire, hiring a few research assistants, and "collecting" hard empirical data. But if his talents and interests lie elsewhere, he feels out of
character in his new project, which therefore does no good to him or
to the others in the field. Still determined, he might try his luck elsewhere by deciding to "dig out" some "interesting" facts about a deservedly forgotten past thinker. His plight is almost like that of a fat
girl who will not wear anything but a mini skirt because this is the only
thing accepted as a dress.
Even in those areas where empirical work is essential, a questionable approach may come to be adopted in the belief that facts must
speak "for themselves," which as we shall presently see they never
do. Collecting facts by indefatigable research may come to be seen as
sufficient for illuminating a problem. For example, a student of international relations, concerned to understand, say, the behavior of the
Secretaries of State, might go on to collect as much data about as many
of them as he could, but would not want to concentrate on just one of
them, intuitively enter into his perception of his role, and construct
a sensitive, historical-biographical-sociological account. Such an attempt- to enter into his mind or to grasp his role subjectively and from
within-is regarded as non-empirical, speculative, and not worth
undertaking. And yet often such a procedure could illuminate the
Secretary's behavior, and that of others like him, much more than a
long list of tables and charts. F acts, scrupulously and diligently collected and stated with mechanical preciseness, still lack flesh and remain uncomprehended. It is amazing how in many research works one
finds only a neat classification of data, but rarely a sustained argument
or a reflective and critical analysis of their various possible
interpretations.
An intellectual inquiry gets distorted not only when it is made to
conform to a narrow and rigid conception of research, but also when
research is divorced from its theoretical underpinnings. A kind of inquiry then arises tha t may be sanctioned by the prevailing academic
consensus but that, m the ultima te analysis, has little intellectual
justification.
Theory performs a t least three important functions for research.
First, it gives research its rationale. One searches facts because one
wants, say, to arrive at a theory, or to falsify a theory, or to arbitrate
between two or more conflicting theories. A theory provides a purpose,
an obj ective to aim at, and thereby determines both the starting point
and the terminus of the inquiry. Second, it guides one's selection of
facts by indicating what facts are relevant and what not, and of those
that are, which ones are significant and which not. Third, when confirmed by facts, a theory becomes an integral part of the existing fund
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of knowledge, which it thereby enriches and expands. Theories are
like tributaries that contribute their respective insights to a constantly
expanding ocean of knowledge.
Now if the inquirer lacks a theory, his research suffers on all three
counts. He does not know why he is collecting facts. Without a guiding
purpose, since facts are in principle infinite, the inquiry has simply no
end, no natural terminus. Like the individual in the classical liberal
theory who had an insatiable appetite for power (Hobbes), or wealth
(Locke), or pleasure (Bentham), or progress (J. S. Mill), the researcher continues aggressively and puritanically to accumulate more
and yet more facts. It is suggestive that we often describe his activity
as one of "gathering," "accumulating," and "aggregating" facts, as if
facts like stones only need to be mechanically piled up. Logically, his
ultimate ideal becomes either to discover every fact about every aspect
of the universe so that nothing new or surprising will ever occur ; or,
more consistently, to keep digging, with the end continually receding,
for newer and newer facts. Research, in its latter form, becomes an
eternally necessary and self-perpetuating activity, since for every fact
discovered, a few more are added to the growing pile of those needing
to be discovered-that this fact was discovered by so and so at such and
such a time in such and such a way. We could always ask and be required to answer if X really discovered it at this time, and in this way.
If, therefore, following our researcher, we agreed to define knowledge
only in terms of the number of facts known, we would constantly be
increasing our ignorance!
Other implications of theory-less research are too obvious to need
detailed consideration. A researcher without a theory lacks any principle of the significance of facts, and since facts cannot be evaluated
in the absence of such a principle, each fact and piece of research
comes to be considered "as good as" another; and the student tends to
believe that as long as he is doing some research, no matter what, he
is engaged in a worth-while activity. As a result, research projects remain unrelated and disparate, and there is no sense of an organic accumulation of knowledge, carried forward from stage to stage, the hallmark of the natural sciences. What is worse, many of these factomaniac
researches come to have a disturbing and profoundly saddening air
of futility about them. A fact is a fact only in the context of a theory.
Countless events constantly occur and disappear in this vast cosmos of
ours, and we never take any notice of them. It is only when one of
them attracts our attention and comes to be considered interesting and
worthy of our notice that it appears as a fact, an event invested with
an interest and endowed with an intellectual dignity. As all judgments
of worth and significance presuppose criteria, which in turn presuppose a general theory of the area concerned, if theoretical homework
is poorly done, our judgment and treatment of facts suffers. We tend
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to introduce shaky assumptions and poorly analyzed concepts, and ask
muddled questions. The "facts" we thus collect and the relations we
establish among them are therefore dubious and cannot be accepted by
a serious theorist who, when these facts are relevant to his theory, will
have to conduct the same inquiry all over again. This never happens
in the natural sciences, where the researcher is not afraid of general
theory, where so many established general theories are already available, and where, over the course of years, criteria of significance have
been so securely and clearly evolved. There is widespread danger of
waste and triviality in the social sciences, though again, not in all of
them. It occurs less often in fairly well-established disciplines like economics than in relatively young, theory-suspicious and somewhat timid
fields of political science, experimental psychology and social science.I
A political scientist who researches into the dressing habits of politicians, a psychologist who asks what annoys people, and comes up, after
several years of indefatigable research, with a list of fifty-five different
things ( such as a badly shaped beard, a hair in their food, and a fly on
their plate), and a social scientist who, with the help of half a dozen
research assistants, inquiries into the washing habits of the workingclass women of a particular area in a small town, are all engaged in
activities whose point is hard to see. Of course, no research in itself is
trivial, but nor is it, in itself, significant. Like stones that a geologist
collects, facts have to be seen in a context, and the context for all significant inquiries is their theoretical interest. Thus, for example, the research on the washing habits of the working-class families could become very interesting if one were trying to test, say, the theory that the
working classes are the least mechanized section of the society; and
similarly the research on the causes of annoyance could become interesting and worth-while if, for example, it was aimed at exploring the
differences between the character of social classes or nations, or at
examining the historical memories of the community that lead it to
associate a hair or a fly with certain unsavory historical episodes, or at
considering if the absence of a clear target in an increasingly bureaucratic society means that anger, a clearly directed emotion towards a
specific object, degenerates into a diffused and grumbling annoyance.
The point can be put schematically. Of any research one wants to
ask and ought to be able to answer the following questions: First, what
theoretical interest or problem has inspired this research? Second, what
sort of general theory is it likely to give 1;se to? Third, is it likely to
give rise to, to open up, a range of other interesting problems? If it
fails on anyone or more of these three counts, its value is immediately
suspect.
The decline of the intellectual

By intellectual I understand a person who takes a sustained and
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knowledgeable interest in the problems of his society and civilization.
His primary concern is to understand, preserve and enrich his civilization, whose ideas and values he articulates, refines and even creates.
Any inquiry that has anything relevant to contribute towards the
understanding of man and society has an interest for him. The findings
of the natural sciences interest him if they throw light on the evolution of man, or on the possibility of the extinction of the species, or
on the development of new technology, or on the way organized social
life is lived. And similarly he takes a keen interest in the findings of
other technical inquiries like the social sciences, philosophy and history.
On the basis of the ideas drawn from various fields he constructs a
synthetic perspective on his civilization. He may be a specialist in one
particular area as well, but he need not be, and in any case it is not
his scholarship that makes him an intellectual. Besides, though deeply
interested in his society, he need not necessarily be politically active,
although he might be if he thought it necessary. He inhabits that intermediate realm between pure theory and practice: he is interested in
ideas but only as they relate to the organized social life; and unlike
a politician he is interested in society not necessarily with a view to
political action but primarily in order to preserve or change the ideas
that dominate the consciousness and influence the behavior of his society. He is a custodian and a critic of the ideas and values, in a word,
character, of his society and civilization. He studies it, defines, criticizes and re-creates it, exposes what is evil and humbug in it and defends and stands up for what is valuable.
In the past, the role of the intellectual was played by a number of
groups, prominent among which were philosophers, theologians, historians and literary figures. Each wielded a distinctive and powerful
medium of communication and a unique type of moral authority. The
theologian spoke and acted on the basis of the deeply held religious beliefs of the members of his society, and commanded their reverence.
The philosopher's strength lay in the realm of the intellect. He was
regarded as someone who synthesized all arts and sciences into an intellectually fascinating weltanschauung. He thus wielded a type of
authority over his contemporaries that came from their admiration
and awe. The historian was seen as a person who explored the origins
of his civilization and who therefore commanded respect for his deep
familiarity with the inner springs of his society. He pointed out the
great men of the past for his contemporaries to emulate; he drew lessons from the past, and dug out historical parallels for contemporary
problems. He was thus expected to inspire, guide, advise, and caution.
As for the literary figures they explored the deepest emotions of the
human mind; and revealed and immortalized the anxieties and hopes
of their society in a way that no one else could, and earned its affection
and love. When all the four groups pulled together their energies and
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different types of authority in a concerted attack on a society or a
civilization, it was doomed.
In recent years a remarkable change has occurred that can only be
described as the replacement of the intellectual by the expert. As this
question is of considerable importance, it would be helpful if we first
distinguished among a professional, a specialist and an expert. A professional is a person educated for a particular calling, for a particular
profession, like that of a lawyer or a priest. He has acquired the body
of knowledge deemed necessa1y by his society for undertaking a socially
useful activity. His is a social activity and involves dealing with other
human beings. It, therefore, raises not only technical but also larger
moral and other questions from which it can never be fully emancipated. A doctor does not deal with patients, but with men who have
fallen ill, and therefore has to consider several non-medical questions.
Further, though the professional activity could thus in principle touch
every aspect of life, it is specific and determinate and his a definite objective and locus. A doctor may have to know my financial situation,
my business worries and the health of my parents, but his main concern is to cure a disease I may be suffering from. Among other things,
this is what distinguishes a professional from an intellectual who has
a wider range of interests and who studies his society as a whole and
not from the standpoint of a specific professional activity. This is why
the expression "a professional intellectual" is somewhat odd. Again,
though the professional activity is a source of livelihood it is much
more than that. It is also a vocation calling for certain definite
standards of honor and integrity that are generally enforced by professional associations.
Within the complex of activities a profession involves, a person
might choose to concentrate on one. A lawyer might decide to make
an intensive study of constitutional or tax law, just as a medical student might decide to specialize in cardiology, and a historian in the
nineteenth century. Such a specialist continues to operate within the
larger context of the profession, but his narrowness of concern introduces certain significant changes. As his activity does not cover the
entire range of the profession, his interest in the larger issues of his
profession is likely to be less than that of the general practitioner. A
tax expert for the most part may be a consultant, and his contacts
more with his fellow-professionals than with ordinary men. This tends
to restrict his range of sympathy and to dilute his interest in the conditions in law courts or in the relations between the lawyer and his client.
However, with all his limitations, a specialist is still a professional, and
the difference between the two is largely one of de~ree.
With the expert one notices a change of kind. He shares with the
specialist his narrow range of interest, but beyond that they part company. An expert is someone who knows, or believes he knows, or is be-
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lieved by others to know, everything about a particular activity. He
wants to, and is expected to, offer "solutions" to problems. His interest
is only in the problem, not in the men who are faced with it. (Generally he is not himself in the position of having to decide a particular
matter, but is someone to whom we turn to tell us what to do in a
given situation.) Indeed, if I started explaining to him the human
context of the problem he would consider it improper and a waste of
his time. His activity thus is purely technical and raises, in his mind,
no broader questions. Knowledge appears to him as a cluster of techniques to be applied to solving problems. He is, in his own view, a
purely cerebral being in whom irrelevant human emotions have been
dried out and who is guided only by the logic of his techniques; he is
the sustaining spirit of the technological age.
In the university today, the trend is in the direction of increasing
specialization. In a sense it began in the middle ages when the universities grew out of professional schools2 and took it as one of their
main objectives to prepare students for a specific calling.3 However as
befits a professional body, they continued to emphasize the general
instruction on life and society, and insisted on a thorough grasp of all
the various aspects of the professional activity. A medical student, for
example, generally studied theology, classics, and everything about the
human body. During the last few decades, partly because of the intense
division of labor required by the advanced industrial society, and pa rtly
perhaps because of the feeling that one lacks a clear professional and
even personal identity unless one is engaged in an unambiguous and
neatly defined work, professionalism has begun to give place to specialization and the tendency of a scholar is to carve out a little area and
concentrate on it. His ambition is to know as much as his talents permit about that area. As a specialist, he feels he should keep himself
familiar with the latest literature in his field and this takes up so much
of his time and energy that he feels he cannot sustain an interest in any
other area. As for the larger issues of his society and civilization, he believes they must be left to appropriate specialists. He is personally not a
specialist on these matters and therefore fee ls his opinions have no
particular value. And in any case, he believes his scholarly objectivity
and detachment require that he should not get involved in situations
that require him to take sides and fight passionately for causes.
For those specialists whose specialty relates directly to the activities
of society, the temptation has been the opposite. Believing like good
behaviorists that their knowledge can be reduced to techniques, believing like good liberals that their society has solved the fundamental
problems of ideological differences, and believing like good specialists
that all problems can be best solved singly and individually, they have
begun to set themselves up as experts. Politics, like anything else, is for
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them a matter of solving isolated problems in the light of available
techniques.
As experts they feel they know the solution of a problem, and that
when they do not, nobody else is likely to know about it either. It is
all a matter of time before they have worked out an answer, and therefore all they need from others is faith a nd patience. When confronted
with critical a nd "noisy" groups who demand radical changes, an expert's attitude is either to dismiss them as stupid and gullible m en who
are led on by others, or to see his troubles as a problem in the failure
of communication a nd therefore needing to be solved by a better
public relations exercise. His tendency is " to get on with the job" and
to forget the trivi al, impatien t a nd unintelligent inter ferences by dissident and critical groups. As he does not belong to or act in concert
with any organized group, the expert believes tha t he is not a "mass
man" ; and since he is thinking solely in terms of objective and scientific techniques, he believes he is disinterested, has no axe to grind , and
cannot but be right. His ultimate hope is to create a society ruled by
experts like himself. Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool outlines "the skeletal
structure of a new society" in which the leadership will rest "with the
research corporation , the industri al laboratories, the expe rimen tal stations, and the universities," with "the scientists, the ma thema ticians,
the economists, and the engineers of the new computer technology."
He goes on, " not only the best talents, but eventually the whole complex of social prestige a nd social status, will be rooted in the intellectual a nd scientific communities."4
Now all this is clea rly untenable. It is true that the conduct of
political life does require taking technical decisions, and tha t therefore
it requires specialist advice. But there are no political or economic
experts, persons whose technques deliver correct solutions to all questions. Political and economic decisions require weighing countless
factors that cannot all be quantified; since many unexpected factors
intervene in a n unpredictable way, what is needed is an intuitive grasp
of the situation, a feel for its uniqueness. And this is not a matter of
expertise. Again, politics is not simply a ma tter of taking- correct decisions but right decisions- tha t is, decisions in accord with the values
and preferences of the community. And these are the elements that inevitably escape from the expert's net. Further, one of the crucial
characteristics of a political decision is tha t it should win the approval
of the people. And this means persuading them, educating them into a
different sense of values from what they are used to, and inspiring
them to do things they normally would not. All this requires tha t a
politician should be in tune with his time, should be sensitive to
cha nges in popular feelings, a nd should have tha t ind efin able quality
of character tha t inspires trust. Expert knowledge is no substitute.
Again, as recent events have shown , it is tota lly wrong to suggest that
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any of the modem soc1et1es has solved the fundamental problems of
organized social life. Even when dissidence is not openly expressed,
there remains a deep malaise in the "silent majority." Thus some of
the fundamental premises of the rule by expert are mistaken.
In defense of the expert's close cooperation with government departments, it is sometimes argued that it "humanizes and civilizes" the
man of power and gives the expert a larger view of his society.5 This
almost amounts to cl aiming tha t the e>..- pert is an intellectu al, carrying
his civilizing mission into the da rk corridors of power. Nothing could
be further from the truth. Mere expertise, as we saw, involves the
elimina tion of the cha racteristic human emotions and choices. It is
ahuman, and cannot by definition humanize anybody. Besides, it is
often the government d epartment that absorbs the expert, silences
him by the demands for secrecy, overwhelms him by countless technical and burea ucratic objections, dazzles him into a false sense of selfimportance, and thus turns him into an administration spokesm an, incapable even of preserving the critical and civilized environment of the
university from the corrupting pressures of government.6
To argue tha t a collection of short-sighted experts can generate a
larger view of society is like a rguing tha t a collection of egoistic individuals can ta ke disinterested political decisions. Both rest on the same
liberal fallacy. Different expert views and standpoints reinforce each
other, or cancel each other out, or crea te a stalemate that is resolved
by a pragmatic compromise based on the pressures exerted by each of
them. Each expert is a purveyor of information and techniques and
not a source of crea tive insight, a nd therefore there cannot be among
them tha t dialectical and organic interplay of ideas from which alone a
broader perspecti ve can emerge. Wha t is more, as each expert qua
expert is committed to belief in the rule by experts and to the type of
society that m akes it possible, not so much because he is selfish as because this is what he considers objectively desirable, he can ha rdl y be
expected to be objective in his analysis of the society. And since the
whole is greater than the sum of its parts and since its logic is different
from that of its parts taken individually, dealing with each problem
individually and seeing it from a number of disparate angles means
that the basic problems of the society and the larger trends developing
in it go unexplored . In short, the role of the intellectual, of a person
viewing his society and civiliza tion as a whole, is extremely crucial a nd
cannot be fill ed by a number of one-eyed experts.
The decline of the intellectual in the modern society7 h as meant
that there is no knowledgeable group of persons to take an active a nd
intelligent interest in their civilization. Of the various groups from
which intellectuals were drawn in the past, only the religious leaders
retain something of their earlier concern, though their influence is
mu ch less, partly because of the increasing secularization of our age,
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and partly because they have lost a part of their earlier authority by
remaining silent when the forces of injustice and inhumanity had
raised their ugly head (as with the Catholic Church in respect to the
Nazis), or by positively supporting them ( as with the various Protestant
churches in respect to the apartheid in South Africa). As for the philosophers, they feel that they are engaged in a highly technical inquiry
that has nothing to say on human affairs. As for the historians, they
believe they study the p ast for its own sake and that therefore they
have no lessons to teach. Literary figures do retain some degree of social and political concern, but their tendency is to put technique and
form over substance, and craftsma nship over the deeper exploration
of the huma n mind.
Sometimes these inhibitions of the scholars are ra ther lightly
brushed aside by impa tient critics. It is suggested, for example, that
a historian today is not doing his proper job and that he should instead
be inspiring a nd guiding us by drawing examples and parallels from
the past, or tha t a political philosopher should be primarily concerned
with constructing utopias and furnishing prescriptions. This is a mistake, as it takes a very questionable view of the nature of the academic
di sciplines concerned and of the relationship between theory and
practice. It implies, for example, tha t a prescription for a specific and
unique practical situation can be deduced from highly abstract and
general theories. And this is surely wrong. The scholar contributes to
the better understanding of his society not so much by applying to it his
specialized findings as by bringing to the study of it a quality of mind
that is critical, detached and sensitive to certain types of problems.
Thus a historian who takes an interest in his civilization, and is thus an
intellectual, sustains and enriches it not primarily by giving some examples and parallels from the past-though he may if there a re anybut rather by bringing to it a historical approach, a mind accustomed
to viewing problems against the backdrop of the past. And this is true
of political philosophers, sociologists, theologians, physicists, a rtists,
economists, and others as well. Each has a certain perspective, a certain sensitivity and therefore illuminates his civilization in his own
uruque way.
The gap left by the decline of the intellectual in the life of the community h as come to be filled by a mixed bag of journalists, retired politicians, party political ideologists, and television and radio commentators, not many of whom h ave any theoretical and historical understanding of their society a nd civilization, or any time or ability to
reflect on them in a detached and critical manner, and whose views
therefore generally spring from nothing more elevated than common
sense prejudices. As the existence of the civilized community is the very
precondition of scholarship, our conception of the la tter needs to be
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expanded so as to facilitate and encourage the growth of th e intellectual. If it is the specialist who fertilizes the intellectual by his findings, it is the intellectual who a ttends to the basic cultural conditions
of scholarship and makes the scholar aware of those larger social and
political assumptions and implications of his work that he is in constant danger of overlooking.
Academic scholarship and ideology
As we h ave seen, intense specialization leads to a decline of interest
in other disciplines than one's own as well as in the larger issues of
one's society and civiliza tion. One of the consequences of this is that
a specialist does not generally confront a situation where he is required
to examine the assumptions on whi ch his discipline rests. H e applies
the tools and methods of his craft that he h as picked up during the
course of his professional training a nd his faith in which is constantly
reinforced by the imposing consensus professionals tend to build up
through inertia, timidity a nd the common habit of citing each other's
work.8 Indeed, often the tools and methods of a discipline a re so
closely identified with the discipline that it is defin ed in terms of them.
Economics may be defined as a science studying the allocations of
scarce resources, so tha t anyone who questions the assumption of
scarcity is rega rded as not doing economics a t all! Similarly, politics
may be defined as persuasion and concilia tion, so tha t revolution, assassination, and acts of violence are not politics a t all. By common consensus a particul a r way of practicing a discipline comes to be recognized as legitimate and a nyone questioning them or practicing a discipline in a different way is regarded as professionally illiterate, needing
further professional socialization. Now, of course, there is nothing objectionable in this .... Indeed a consensus among the practitioners of
a discipline is unavoidable and necessary, as otherwise it lacks a corpus
of tools and methods by which to define itself and into which to induct
its new practitioners. What is obj ection able is the subtle way in which
a consensus, here as elsewhere, can lead a discipline into a narrow a nd
rigid intellectual groove by preventing it from asking cri tical a nd
fundamental questions.
As a scholar's concepts and methods are derived from the existing
consensus, he comes to believe that these are the only ways his discipline can be p racti ced. He is thoroughly inducted into his profession
and, as befits a professional, h e has learned to rise above all personal
preferences and inclin a tions, to take no sides, a nd to put aside all passions and prejudices. He has also learned to collect facts with clinical
thoroughness, and to deal with them in a systematic and methodical
ma nner tha t is professionally approved . Since he thus lets "facts speak
for themselves" and does not interpose himself between the facts and
the conclusion they entail, it is only to be expected, he concludes, that
his judgments will be disinterested and objective. When therefore some100

one, usually a left-wing critic, questions his professional tools, and inquires if they do not spring from or involve social and political preferences, he feels outraged and tends to dismiss him as wanting to politicize and contaminate the pursuit of knowledge by raising the ideological dust that he himself has long since risen above.
And yet this is simply not true. If one carefully considers the way
he practices his discipline, one notices that it rests on a number of assumptions no less ideological than those of his critic, but which he has
failed to notice because he has imbibed them unconsciously and also
because, when articulated, they appear so self-evidently true to him.
Take the example of the studies of the developing countries. The very
language in which the latter are described is suggestive. Till about the
end of the nineteenth century, they were referred to as primitive. L ater
they came to be described as backward. After the second world war
when many of these countries became independent the terminology
began to change, and they came to be referred to first as undeveloped,
then as underdeveloped and lately as developing. In all these terminological changes one thing has remained constant, and that is a certain normative standard by which these countries are judged and
graded as developed, underdeveloped, and less or more developed.
This standard is predominantly economic, and is formu lated in terms
of a certain annual growth rate of the gross national product or of the
per capita income. Thus from the total social life of these communities
a single aspect is abstracted and treated as all important. It is, of
course, very important to eliminate poverty and to help people achieve
a certain level of comfort. However, other values like freedom, respect
for life, continuity in the historical identity of the community, longterm political stability, and social and economic equality are all no less
important. And therefore what is called for is a balanced growth of
the society as a whole of which economic growth is one important part.
If one inquires why the developmental analysis gives so much importance to the economic criteria one is led to a conception of man
and to a theory of social change on which their views rest. They seem
to believe like good liberals that man is essentially an economic being
who defines himself in terms of his status in the social economy and
whose dominant motivation is the accumulation of money. This is indeed how rationality is defined, a rational man being one who calculates, "weighs" pros and cons, and pursues the line of maximum gain.
This conception of man leads to the further belief that economic factors
are the sole or the most important determinants of social change,9 and
therefore, that once a country has reached an advanced stage of industrialization it will create a bourgeois-managerial class that will then
go on to sustain an appropriate political, moral and cultural system.
The implication therefore is that the first priority should be given to
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the fullest possible industrialization of these societies, unrestrained by
any other consideration.
When the criteria and indices of development born within the
framework of the economistic conception of man are applied to the
developing countries they lead to strange results. The behavior of their
inhabitants appears totally incomprehensible to the developmental experts. The Americans gave Kenyan fishermen motorized boats so that
they could explore hitherto unexplored fishing grounds to catch more
fish. The happy fishermen finding that they could now haul a day's
load in an hour enjoyed themselves the rest of the day. The Burmese
Buddhists, feeling that the inner tranquility and happiness was the
most important objective in life, resisted pressure to work hard to
make more money, to the utter frustration of the Americans. In the
eyes of the developmental experts, these men are "irrational," "backward," "pre-modern," "uncivilized." Their traditional society, seen as
the opposite of the modem society mustl, it is suggested, be destroyed
and modelled after the western society.
Further as the economic life in these countries is still immersed in
the social and religious structure, it does not have the autonomy and
independence it enjoys in the developed western society. And therefore
the conventional methodological tools, that presuppose individualistically oriented economy, and the conventional concepts like unemployment, maximization of utility, saving and accumulation of capital do
not make very much sense. In any attempt to apply the conceptual
framework rooted in the western e>..'Perience, the history of the community, its distinctive tradition, its past experiences, are rarely taken
into account; and it is not asked if perhaps different societies and cultures do not involve different conceptions of man and life, if the neat
contrast between the "traditional" and the "modern" society is really
tenable, and if the former must be destroyed in order for its people to
live a better life than at present.
The controversy about the criterialO of development does not remain merely academic. It comes to have disturbing practical results.
When most of the experts, government advisors, and the shrewd politicians in the developed western world are all agreed that this it what
development consists in, the recipient country accepts it as its ideal and
concentrates exclusively on achieving the magic figure of economic
growth, distorting in the process its moral, political, cultural and other
values. If the increase in population hinders economic growth or shows
that per capita income is rising less fast, it feels it must reduce its
population at all cost, even by forcibly arresting and sterilizing men
as has happened in India in recent years. Conditioned by these criteria
the country concerned feels it cannot maintain its self-respect, and cannot please its donors and cannot earn good marks from international
developmental experts unless it keeps showing good economic results.
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The donor country for its part directs its aid to those that have reached
or are reaching a stipulated growth rate and whose citizens are beginning to show signs of economic "rationality."
In all these and other ways, the consensus on the definition of development becomes a means of influencing people's behavior in a certain definite direction. The ethnocentricity of the definition goes unnoticed, and so does the fact that the developmental analysis is becoming a subtle and effective, if unwitting, instrument of imposing the
bourgeois-liberal conception of man on nearly three quarters of mankind. Not just foreign aid but apparently well-meaning and politically
neutral academic disciplines become a means of molding a large part
of humanity in the image of the western man.
Similar ideological assumptions also underlie economics, sociology,
philosophy, history, psychology, anthropology, political theory and a
number of other larger and smaller fields of inquiry. Take an example
of political philosophy. Many political thinkers regard "why should
I obey the state" as one of the fundamental questions of political
philosophy. I I Now they are obviously right, and indeed they belong
to a tradition that goes at least as far back as Hobbes. But if one considers the question a little further, one detects a number of questionable
assumptions underlying it. It implies that the state is an entity existing
independently and outside of its individual members, rather than that
it is, as Rousseau said, simply a certain mode or level of individual
consciousness so that it exists, is realized, only in and through the actions of its members. The question assumes, further, that it is my
status as a subject and not as a citizen that is really the center of interest,
since otherwise we should ask not why I should obey the state but
rather what we should do as citizens to make it a better state. Instead
of saying that one is obeying a law, one might want to say that one is
supporting and affirming it; and one might feel that one's relation to
the state is not simply or primarily one of obedience but rather of actively participating in its affairs, proposing new policies, and standing
up for politically right causes. It assumes, again, that the question
of political obligation is asked and answered by an individual deliberating in his sovereign isolation, rather than that the decision has
to be taken by us as a community and therefore by "me" as one unit
in "us." That is to say, it assumes that "I" is politically speaking prior
to "we" and that "we" is a plural of "I," rather than that it is "we"
that is prior and that "I" is only a singular of "we." If this were realized
one might prefer to ask how we as a community should respond to a
law and what obligations devolve on me as a member of it. One might
even ask if it is proper to speak in terms of political obligation, since it
has a legalistic connotation and therefore refers only to those actions
that can be exacted on pain of punishment and not to those as well
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that are expected of a citizen in any civilized and politically educated
community. One might therefore choose a wider term, political duty.
If these and several other assumptions underlying the problem of
why I should obey the state, are clarified, one finds that this is a question that could arise only in a society that is suspicious of the state, that
draws a neat distinction between the individual and the state and regards law and liberty as essentially antithetical, that confines politics
to the politicians, and that regards the individual as essentially a
private and not a public being who finds politics somewhat uncongenial and unnatural and who therefore judges it by the strictest
standards of personal utility. That is to say, it is a question that acquires its meaning and urgency largely within the context of liberal
ideology. Not that it is an unimportant question but that in a different
conception of man and society it would be seen as part of a larger
question like what a citizen should do to make his community a much
better society than it is, or, to use a somewhat clumsy expression of G.
E. Moore, what he could do to maximize the political good.12
Again, take social psychology. Many works in the field hold up as
ideal the normal man, defined as one who is well-adjusted to the existing society, who is "socialized," straight, correct. What this often
means is that a strong and passionate expression of opinion, a display
of anger and indignation, a resolute refusal to compromise, and
tenacity in the pursuit of an unpopular cause come to be seen as a sign
of abnormalcy, of mental disturbance, and in need of treatment. A
Lenin or a Nasser or a Castro is then seen as a crank or a psychopath
and that is the end of him. It is not considered important to take his
criticisms seriously; instead a research is made into his childhood experiences to trace the "causes" of his "abnormalcy" ! When Bertrand
Russell died, a distinguished commentator argued in a long article in
a British national daily that Russell's championship of various causes,
like the unilateral nuclear disarmament, the Vietnam war tribunal and
the democratization of the university-the causes the commentator
did not like at all-was due to his acute feeling of loneliness, generated
by the absence of love and intimate friends in his childhood! The students of Nantes felt so strongly about the ideological nature of social
psychology that they boycotted their psychology lectures on the ground
that the total rejection of it was the only way to reaffirm personal
liberty and respect for critical thought.13
These and other examples show how scholarship can become rather
narrow, uncritical, restrictive, even suffocating, and at times subtly manipulative. It can reinforce a particular structure of beliefs and preferences and dismiss others out of hand. The question we should consider
now is what follows from this realization and recognition of the possible ideological assumptions and implications of the academic pursuits.
Some skeptics have suggested that as all knowledge is inherently
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ideological, we can never reach the truth, and that therefore the very
pursuit of knowledge and truth is ultimately illusory. This is clearly
wrong, as it is like saying that no man should try to be good or better
because he can never be perfect. Though absolute knowledge is impossible, it does not mean that one conclusion cannot be judged better
or more reliable than another. We can, and do, judge and arbitrate
among various views in terms of their consistency and the arguments
and the evidence that can be produced for and against them.
Relativists take the view that as all knowledge is ideological, one
conclusion is as good as another and that the truth ultimately depends
on one's standpoint and preference. This too is a mistake. Like the
skeptic's argument it implies that one view cannot be judged as better
or more tenable than another, and this is simply not true. Besides, it
fails to see that the existence of several ideologies, far from leading
to a relativist take-your-pi ck situation, is one of the very preconditions
of intellectual progress. It enables us to consider a problem from a
number of perspectives and thus to perceive the contributions and limitations of each by requiring it to take account of the criticisms made
by others.
Marcuse has taken a third, almost totally opposite, view that it is
possible to reach the truth that is free from all ideological conditioning,
and that therefore we are justified in suppressing the mistaken and
ideological bourgeois works of scholarship. As he says,
the restoration of freedom of thought may necessitate new and
rigid restrictions on teachings and practices in the educational
institutions which, by their very methods and concepts, serve to
enclose the mind within the established universe of discourse
and behavior-thereby precluding a priori a rational evaluation
of the alternatives. And to the degree to which freedom of
thought involves the struggle against inhumanity, restoration of
such freedom would also imply intolerance toward scientific research .... I shall presently discuss the question as to who is to
decide on the distinction between liberating and repressive,
human and inhuman teachings and practices; I have already
suggested that this distinction is not a matter of value-preference
but of rational cri teria.15

He is restrained in his argument and suggests no more than that the
liberating intolerance could be enforced in the university by teachers
and students voluntarily refraining from teaching and learning the
bourgeois works of scholarship. Not unexpectedly, some of his followers have taken this to be a plea for wrecking lectures and threatening
teachers and burning books. They have even implied that the "bourgeois" standards of scholarship should be ignored and even positively
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violated, and that books should be judged "good" or "great" in proportion to the goodness of the cause they propound.
Now this, what one might call, academic antinomianism is clearly
untenable. Marcuse's argument rests on the belief that he has grasped
the absolute truth, and this is a very tall claim to make, particularly
for M arcuse who often takes notorious short cuts to his conclusions,
and does not produce much empirical evidence for his views and closely examine and refute the likely objections of his critics. He writes
more like a prophet revealing an apocalyptic vision than like someone
undertaking a rational evaluation of the alternatives that he himself
talks about in the remarks quoted above. But there are more basic objections. M arcuse fails to notice the difference between the university
and the political society at large, or what is the same thing, between
the academic and the political freedom. One can imagine situations
where the expression of certain views may have to be suppressed in
the political realm in order to forestall certain practical consequences.
Thus, for example, Marcuse's idea of liberating intolerance makes
sense in the political li fe where untouchability or racialism or fascism
may have to be forcibly put down and their advocacy forbidden, when
they are no longer a freak and marginal social phenomenon, and where
their political exploitation can seriously frustrate the good work done
by the government. Indeed, there is hardly a liberal society that allows
freedom to incite racial or communal hatred. But the case of the university is very different, it being a place where these and such other
views are discussed at the academic and the theoretical levels, where
immediate practical consequences are not likely to follow, and whose
members are used to listening to, and indeed trained to listen to and to
deal good-humoredly and critically with, eccentric and extreme views.
And therefore a discussion, even a sympathetic discussion, of even the
most bourgeois and abominable doctrines cannot be restricted in the
university.
Again, Marcuse like any other philosopher is not a disembodied
mind, and it is he, and not his mind, that thinks. And therefore his
interests, hopes, fears, unconscious biases, prejudices, preferences would
certainly tend to enter into his thinking and influence his initial choice
of premises, concepts and methods, and the reasons he finds persuasive.
As concrete and determinate creatures born at a specific historical time
in a specific society in a specific family, men are conditioned socially,
culturally, biologically, historically and in a variety of other ways; and
therefore cannot aspire to an absolute knowledge, a knowledge that is
totally liberated from all possible assumptions and presuppositions.
Further, with all his shrewd understanding of the Hegelian dialectic,
Marcuse here seems to understand negation as an abstract and blanket
rejection of what exists, since otherwise he should know that the less
ideological scholarship can emerge only by subjecting the existing
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" bourgeois" scholarship to continual and rigorous criticism. Finally, in
suppressing views that disagree with his, Marcuse forecloses the possibility of rational debate and intellectual growth, since it is only by
criticisms made from other perspectives that the limitations inherent
in one's own becomes noticeable.
None of these three approaches-skepticism, relativism, or the Marcusean absolutism-provides an answer to the question posed by the
ideological assumptions lurking underneath many academic disciplines.
Central to scholarship are the two general beliefs that we noted above:
man is a conditioned being who can never claim absolute validity for
his knowledge, and, second, he can constantly strive to improve and
refine his knowledge. One gives humility, and the other confidence, to
the academic enterprise. As it is only by constant and rigorous criticism
that scholarship improves and becomes self-critical, the answer ultimately lies, to reiterate a commonplace, in institutionalizing rational
criticism, so that we are constantly required to search and defend the
hidden assumptions of our methods and questions and concepts.
Further, if the criticism based on a different ideological standpoint
from the one currently practiced is to have a persuasive and constructive tone, it must express itself in substantial works of scholarship. A
scholarly work like Macpherson's analysis of the bourgeois social assumptions of Hobbes and Locke, or like Lucas' or Sartre's critical
analysis of the nineteenth century literature, does a lot more to question the established canons of scholarship than a polemical but ineffective diatribe.
As we observed earlier, part of the reason why ideological assumptions go undetected is that many academic disciplines are approached
in a highly specialized way. A narrow area of knowledge cannot be
cultivated without taking some account of the larger field of which it
is a part. And when this larger field is not cultivated and when general
theories and paradigms are not developed the specialist tends to pick
up the conventional assumptions and commonplaces about it. A specialized discipline is therefore in constant danger of becoming pedestrian
and n aive unless it constantly raises larger questions about itself. Since
this requires a philosophical interest and orientation, social sciences
at least could never be divorced from philosophy. Science-philosophy
distinction, when carried too far, trivializes social sciences and emasculates philosophy.
We saw earlier how academic scholarship has in many cases come
to rest on the questionable analysis of the concepts of objectivity and
truth. Objectivity does not arise from letting facts speak for themselves. Facts are mute and have to be interpreted. And interpretation
involves a theory in the construction of which the theorist's value
judgments unavoidably enter. Objectivity therefore does not mean
mechanical impersonality, as that is simply impossible. Sometimes it is
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suggested that the only notion of objectivity that is appropriate to the
study of man, and even to that of nature, is the one that involves an
impartial consideration of the relevant evidence, and the willingness
to look out for new, and in particular, inconvenient evidence and
arguments and to change one's views when shown to be wrong. However, even the notion of impartiality needs to be tightened up further
if it is not to conceal the grossest partiality. What is to count as
evidence, and by what criteria we are to decide what evidence is
relevant, are questions that need to be answered first before the "impartial consideration of relevant evidence" can be accepted as an indication of objectivity, since they are most likely places through which
partiality can smuggle itself in. A specialist may collect all his evidence with clinical thoroughness, but if his framework is restricted and
biased from the start, his so-called impartiality conceals a partiality.
For example, a historian who thinks he is only collecting "all the facts"
without any prejudice or preference may, in fact, be smuggling in most
insidious prejudices. And even if he does not, his very assumptions that
all facts are equally significant, that knowledge has no relevance to
human needs and that he, personally, does not wish to make any difference to the world around him by his research, are themselves normative assumptions that he has unconsciously imbibed from his likeminded fellow-professionals. The refusal to make judgment is, itself, a
judgment. It is a mistake to believe, as do many psychologically naive
social scientists, that partiality occurs only when a choice is made consciously, and that if one picks up problems and facts immediately one
cannot be partial.
Objectivity does not rule out passion or interest either, since they
often dispose one to look out for new problems and assumptions. For
example, a person who feels passionately about a particular reform is
likely to be very sensitive to the inarticulate assumptions underlying
the defenders of the status quo. As long as passion does not generate
bias and close the mind to inconvenient evidence. it is not a vice. And
if one considers scholarship not at the individual level but from the
standpoint of the discipline as a whole, even a bias is an advantage, as
it not only makes novel criticisms of the way the discipline is practiced
at present but it also suggests new directions. A fascist, for example, is
clearly biased in his criticism of the liberal political theory, but he exposes some of its profound weaknesses and raises problems that are
generally ignored by its supporters.
Nor, finally, does objectivity mean neutrality or a lack of commitment, since after an impartial investigation a scholar may, and does
generally, come to a definite conclusion which he would then wish to
uphold. For example, after a careful examination he might come to accept, say, the Marxist analysis of society as far more satisfactory than
the liberal or the positivist analysis, and then go on to analyze specific
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problems in its light. He is no less objective than the mainstream liberal
social theorist. It is, of course, crucial that he should not press his
framework dogmatically into areas where it does not apply, and that
he should be alert to the evidence and arguments that may be made
against it. But to dismiss, as many are prone to do, a person as ideological, biased and unscholarly simply because he wants to examine the
economic and social assumptions made by a moral or a religious or a
political philosopher is hardly proper, as it is itself an assertion of dogmatic and ideological partiality.
In short, impersonality does not ensure impartiality, but often the
opposite. Nor does one need to be disinterested or dispassionate in
order to be objective. And further, as the standards of objectivity do
not spring from high heavens but are conditioned and tainted by the
limitations and preferences of the men who have evolved them, they
cannot be regarded as sacrosanct and used to beat down unfamiliar or
ideologically disagreeable works of scholarship. Thus the reappraisal of
scholarship that is ultimately needed is the reappraisal not just of
specific disciplines but also of the very nature of scholarship---of its
nature, its objectives, its standards, its criteria of truth and objectivity.
And this is a task that cannot be accomplished overnight but only over
the decades as audacious works appear that challenge the established
conception of scholarship both by criticizing it and by showing by
example how a richer conception of it is possible.
Finally, as scholarship is not a cerebral but a human activity that is
ultimately limited by the limitations of the men practicing it, and as
some of the elements of our thinking draw their strength and plausibility from our personal preferences and our social position, it is an
advantage for the development of a discipline if its practitioners have
diverse social backgrounds, as they would then bring different insights
and sensitivities. The radical critique is right to stress this point, since
a discipline can easily get inflexible, inbred and somewhat narrow
when all its practitioners share a common social background and similar social experiences. Intellectual openness and flexibility is not entirely unrelated to social openness and flexibility. And therefore the expansion of educational opportunities to cover those hitherto excluded
is desirable not only politically but also in the very interest of the
growth of scholarship.
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FOOTNOTES
I. Social science should be clearly distinguished from sociology, a discipline
with a longer history than it is given credit for and of which the modern
social science in some of its forms is a p ale ghost. Historically speaking.
sociology, whether in the hands of Aristotle or Montesquieu or Marx or
Mannheim or Weber or Durkheim, has always remained c losely connected
with philosophy, history and moral theory. When classical sociology was
dissociated first from history, then from philosophy, and then fin a lly from
moral theory as well the result was something resembling the modern social
science that lacks the sense of direction that only history can give, the
clarity of concepts and the consciousness of its assumptions that only philoophy can offer; and he capacity for evaluating the significance of facts. that
can come only from a moral theory.

2. The universities of Bologna and Paris grew out of the law and the theology
school.

3. An academic is a professional, and therefore not necessarily an intellec tual,
though he should be one.
4. Quoted by Prof. Chomsky, The New York Review of Books, January 2,
1969.

5. These are the views of Prof. Ithiel de Sola Pool, qu oted by Chomsky, ibid.
6. Senator Fullbright has recently argued how the universities, instead of
providing "any effective counterweight to the military-industria l complex"
have "joined the monolith, adding greatly to its power and influ ence." In
refusing to act "as responsible and independent critics of the government's
policies" they are "betraying a public trust," "The War and its EffectsII," Congressional Record, December 13, I 967.
7. This has happened in different d egrees in different countries. In France,

which has long enjoyed the glorious intellectual tradition, the intellectual
is still a fami liar animal. In England, the degree of profession alism is much
greater and there is a reluctance to undertake an activity that one cannot
pursue with professional seriousness and competence. The same tende ncy
prevails in America, though there are signs of change as more and more
academics, agonized by the Vietnam war, are beginning to ask searching
questions about the quality of life in their society.

8. For how this is done, see Christian Bay's "The Cheerful Science of Dismal
Politics" in Th. Rozzak, ed. The Dis~e nting Academy ( Pantheon Books,
1968), p. 220ff.
9. Much of this is also true of the socialists who thus combine with the
liberals in producing an almost universal consensus on the emphasis on
industrialization. After that, of course, the two part company.
10. In recent years, there is a trend in the direction of broadening the criteria
of development to include political and cultural elements as well. But even
here the basic western liberal bias persists. The two-party system, secularization, open bargaining, competing elite, socialization of the masses into a
rational-bureaucratic culture, absence of a strong ideological commitmentare all considered crucia l to political d evelopment. Indeed the term westernization is used synonymously with modernization, rationalization and
development. See Gabriel A. Almond and G . Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, L ittle Brown & Co .,
1966 ) , p. 61; and C. Ake , A Theory of Political Int egration (Dorsey Press,
196 7 ) , chs. 2 and 7.
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11. Even Sir Isaiah Berlin takes this view. See his "Does political th eory still
exist"? in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed., P. Laslett a nd W . Runcima n
(London, 1962 ), series II, p . 7.
12. Prof. Graeme Moodie has been helpful in fonnulating my ideas on this
question.
13. Gabrie l a nd D a niel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism, The L eft Wing
Al.ternative ( Penguin, 1969), p. 31.
14. Both the skeptica l and the relativist positions can be knocked down on
forma l logical grounds as well. Though the skeptic maintains th a t we can
never reach the truth, he is already claiming tha t we know at least this as
the truth ! Likewise, the relativist, while emphasizing the rela tivity of a ll
knowledge , asse rts at least this proposition as absolutely true ! And since
both of them thus recognize at least one exception, there is no reason why
they cannot admit others.
15. Robert Pau l Wolff, Barrington Moore, H erbert M arcuse, A Critique of
Pure Tolerance (Beacon Press, 1969 ) , p. 100£.
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